Only weeks after Sunni jihadists in Iraq declared the establishment
of an Islamic caliphate covering parts of Syria and Iraq, Libya’s Ansar
al-Shari’a movement has declared an Islamic emirate in eastern Libya
after driving government forces and their allies from the city of
Benghazi. The defeat of the strongest pro-government forces in eastern
Libya has provided the Islamists with an impressive victory, but Ansar
al-Shari’a and its allies are still struggling to obtain the support of
Benghazi’s urban population and the powerful tribes dwelling in its
hinterland.
The Libyan Emirate in the Modern Era
As the provinces that eventually formed modern Libya began to fall to
British and French military forces following a string of defeats
suffered by Italy, the colonial power in Libya, there were several
abortive attempts to create a modern emirate in eastern Libya. In
anticipation of post-war independence in return for supporting the
Allied cause, the Libyans agreed to the formation of a joint
Tripolitanian-Cyrenaican Emirate with Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi as leader
in 1940 (the third province, Fezzan, remained under French military
administration from 1943 to 1951). This plan, however, began to
disintegrate after liberation from Italian occupation in 1943 as the two
Libyan provinces jostled for control of the new state. Sayyid Idris
foresaw the emergence of Britain as the main power broker in a
post-colonial Libya (unlike the Tripolitanian leaders, who had
incorrectly foreseen an Axis victory) and raised five battalions of the
“Libyan Arab Force” to assist Allied operations in the North African
desert campaign. A 1945 U.S. plan for a Cyrenaican emirate under British
and Egyptian supervision failed to gain support, but in 1949, Britain
decided unilaterally to create a Cyrenaican emirate under the leadership
of Sayyid Idris, with foreign affairs, defense issues and military
bases all remaining under British control. By the time independence
arrived in 1951, plans for an emirate had been abandoned in favor of a
federal constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament. [1]
Ansar al-Shari’a in Libya
The Islamist militia, established in post-revolutionary Libya in
2012, has a power base in the eastern cities of Derna and Benghazi. It
was in the latter city that the movement was deeply implicated in the
September 11, 2012 attack on the American Consulate. Ten days later, the
group was driven from Benghazi by mass protests, but by March 2013, it
was back in Benghazi, this time with a greater emphasis on providing
social services to city residents.
New tensions began to arise in June, when Major-General Khalifa
Haftar’s forces began launching attacks on armed Islamist militias in
Benghazi and Derna and preliminary results of the parliamentary election
revealed a massive rejection of Islamist candidates (all seats were
contested on an individual rather than party basis). Afraid of being
shut out of the political process, the Islamist militias in Benghazi
(including Ansar al-Shari’a, the Libya Shield Brigade no. 1, the 17
February Brigade and the Rafallah Sahati Brigade) united under an
umbrella structure known as the Shura Council of Benghazi
Revolutionaries (Daily Star [Beirut], August 1). Many of these
groups are affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood stronghold in Misrata.
The restructuring at first helped limit Haftar’s successes in the
region before allowing the united Islamists to push back against
Haftar’s outnumbered “National Army” and its allies.
In June, Ansar al-Shari’a leader Muhammad al-Zawahi reasserted his
movement’s opposition to both the government and democracy in general,
while warning the United States to forget about military intervention in
Libya in view of America’s “despicable defeats in Iraq, Afghanistan and
Somalia,” promising it would “face worse from Libya” (BBC, June 13).
Expelling al-Sa’iqah
On July 29, Ansar al-Shari’a and its allies in the Shura Council
mounted a bold attack on the Benghazi base of the pro-government
al-Sa’iqah (Thunderbolt) Special Forces, an elite unit led by Colonel
Wanis Bu-Khamada that is allied to General Haftar, but not under his
direct command. Haftar’s ongoing Operation al-Karamah (Dignity) is an
attempt to eliminate Islamist militias in Libya and restore order in the
lawless cities. The Islamist attack succeeded in taking the main camp
of al-Sa’iqah, located in the Bu-Atni district of Benghazi.
With the capture of most of the city (excluding a part of the airport
still controlled by Haftar’s forces), Ansar al-Shari’a leader Muhammad
al-Zahawi declared on July 30 that “Benghazi has now become an Islamic
emirate” (Radio Tawhid, July 30; al-Jazeera, July 31). Haftar insisted
that his forces had only conducted a “tactical withdrawal” from parts of
Benghazi and that the Islamist claimi to control the city was “a lie”:
“There is a difference between control and looting and thefts. After the
Special Forces withdrew from the Special Forces' camp, [the Islamists]
tried to steal what they could steal” (al-Arabiya, July 30; July 31).
Since mid-July, the Shura Council has taken five military bases in the
Benghazi region, including the main Special Forces camp in Benghazi,
overcoming strikes from Libyan jet fighters and helicopters in their
advance (al-Jazeera, July 31). Benghazi’s main police station was also
abandoned after being shelled by Shura Council forces.
Losses were heavy, with at least 78 soldiers killed in the assault on
the base. Large quantities of arms, rockets, ammunition and even
armored vehicles were seized from the stockpiles of the Special Forces
(AFP/al-Akhbar [Beirut], July 30; Daily Star [Beirut],
August 1). A video released soon after the battle showed Ansar
al-Shari’a commander Muhammad al-Zawahi touring the battered Special
Forces camp with Libyan Shield Brigade commander Wissam Bin Hamid, who
declared: “We will not stop until we establish the rule of God.” [2] Bin
Hamid no doubt took satisfaction in having expelled al-Sa’iqah, having
been driven from his own headquarters in June 2013 by Special Forces
units.
A Libyan National Army spokesman, Colonel Muhammad Hijazi, denied
rumors of differences between Colonel Bu Khamada and General Haftar,
adding that the withdrawal of al-Sa’iqah from its Benghazi base was “a
military strategy. We are fighting against international intelligence
organs like the Qatari and Turkish intelligence services” (al-Sharq al-Awsat,
August 1). There is a general belief in the forces allied to Haftar
that the Islamists are materially and politically supported by Qatar and
Turkey. However, despite the defeat, Special Forces commander Wanis
Bu-Khamada insisted that his forces “still have the capacity to repel
any attack on state institutions” (al-Ahrar TV, August 2).
Following the Islamist victory, Muhammad Sawwan, the leader of
Libya’s Hizb al-Adala wa’l-Bina (Justice and Construction Party, the
political arm of Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood), condemned Haftar’s
Operation Dignity as armed interference with the political process and
insists the poor showing by Islamists in parliamentary election results
has nothing to do with the violence in Benghazi and Tripoli: “The
parliamentary elections were held on the basis of the individual system.
Therefore, talking about progress of one current and the defeat of the
other is baseless” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 1).
The Fallout
The Shura Council’s offensive forced the cancellation of a meeting of
the new parliament to be held in Benghazi on August 4, forcing it to
meet in Tobruk instead (BBC, July 30; AP, August 6). The new parliament
immediately issued an order for an unconditional ceasefire in Benghazi
and Tripoli (where similar clashes are underway) and promised, without
the force to carry it out, that action would be taken against any group
that failed to observe the ceasefire (Libya Herald, August 7).
While Haftar’s ground troops failed to reoccupy military facilities
that had been abandoned after looting by the Islamists, his air assets
launched strikes against the compound of a Chinese construction company
in Ajdabiya that had been taken over by Ansar al-Shari’a forces (Libya
Herald, August 1). Haftar’s National Army has offered to protect further
civilian demonstrations in Benghazi, though it is not clear how this
would be possible without a presence in Benghazi (Libya Herald, August
1).
While there is some consensus that foreign jihadists are arriving in
Libya in substantial numbers, exact figures are impossible to obtain.
According to General Haftar, the Islamists “are aided by renegade groups
like them from all around the world. Unfortunately, in the absence of a
government or police, those groups use this opportunity to come from
Algeria, Mali, Niger, and even elsewhere. They even come from overseas.
Many of them came from Afghanistan and many other areas” (al-Arabiya,
July 30).
For now, the oil-fields of eastern Libya remain in production, but as
part of a much diminished national rate of 500,000 barrels per day
(b.p.d.), as opposed to a normal 1.4 million b.p.d. (Reuters, July 29).
Oil accounts for some 95 percent of state revenues in Libya.
Conclusion
Ansar al-Shari’a’s declaration of an emirate was met with popular
anger rather than acclaim, with large crowds of angry civilians taking
to the streets of Benghazi. The protesters ignored a pair of warning
volleys from Ansar militiamen and forced the gunmen from the Jala’a
hospital they occupied in Benghazi, tearing down the black-and-white rayat al-uqab
banner also used by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda and replacing it
with a Libyan flag (Libya Herald, July 30). There were also reports that
the demonstrators torched the home of Ansar al-Shari’a leader Muhammad
al-Zahawi (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 31). The failure of forces
belonging to Haftar’s Operation Dignity to capitalize on this unexpected
civilian triumph allowed the Islamists to re-assert themselves in an
even stronger position in Benghazi by July 31.
Haftar’s National Army, still without official recognition from the
government, has managed to gain the allegiance of a number of
pro-government armed groups (some of which are probably reconsidering
their position at this point), but has failed to get the all-important
support of Libya’s tribes, which continue to withhold their commitment
to one side or the other of the ongoing conflict. For now, both Ansar
al-Shari’a and Haftar’s National Army claim to be receiving new weapons,
promising another round of the urban warfare that is beginning to
inflict severe damage on some neighborhoods of Benghazi (Libya Herald,
July 29). Unless and until General Haftar and/or the new Libyan
government can bring both trained troops and the nation’s influential
tribes on board with the anti-Islamist program, Libya will remain a
gathering point for international jihadis and Libyan fighters returning
from the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, something the defeated forces
allied to the national government may find themselves powerless to
prevent.
Andrew McGregor is Director of Aberfoyle International Security, a
Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues related to the
Islamic world.
Notes
1. Alison Pargeter, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi, Yale University Press, 2012, Chapter 1; John Oakes, Libya: The History of a Pariah State, History Press, Stroud, Gloucestershire, 2011, Chapter 6.
2. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YHUDbffJloo.
Source: http://www.jamestown.org
Radical Islam Monitor in Southeast Europe
